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Abstract
Efforts to secure protection for refugees in the Netherlands are being undermined by
over-enthusiastic use of the exclusion principle in refugee status determination
procedures. Inappropriate use of the exclusion principle is tied to accelerated (albeit
ineffective) efforts to secure justice for human rights violators. As this article argues,
the tensions that arise are unacceptable, but can be appropriately addressed through a
(re)commitment to both principles and pragmatism. A principled commitment would
ensure that due process is thoroughly respected in asylum determination procedures.
This must be accompanied by a pragmatic, rights-based application of the aut dedere
aut judicare principle (extradite or prosecute), reinforced by strengthened coordination
between the government agencies responsible for asylum and prosecution.
1. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the current challenges facing the international
asylum regime, with some even claiming that there is a ‘crisis’1 in the regime
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due to changed priorities in global politics and an increase in the mobility of
persons seeking asylum. Whether or not a ‘crisis’ exists, there has
undoubtedly been a tendency in recent years by States that have traditionally
offered refugee protection to restrict the numbers of those being granted
asylum.
This restrictive tendency in the asylum regime has been paralleled by the
rapid development of international criminal law. Discussions on criminal
law and refugee protection have largely been carried out in isolation of each
other, and there is still considerable lack of clarity on the connection
between these two legal principles.2 These trends have had the unfortunate
consequence of splitting the human rights discourse, thus raising
considerable tensions between two separate legal traditions that should be
operating in tandem with each other. It has also created a significant risk
that fundamental human rights may be violated in the attempt to seek
‘justice’.
Tragic events in the United States on 11 september 2001, followed by an
aggressive military response by (predominantly) the USA and its allies, have
accelerated restrictive approaches towards foreigners and asylum applica-
tions in particular. At the same time, there has been great resistance to the
pursuance of justice at a supra-national level. The United States, which
continues to openly resist the establishment of an International Criminal
Court, has proposed that military commissions try persons suspected of
terrorism, in spite of claims by some that this would be illegal, both in terms
of its own constitution and international law.3 The USA has also extended its
policy of routine detention of asylum seekers and adopted an increasingly
restrictive approach towards the interpretation of asylum claims and
treatment of asylum seekers.4 Other countries have emulated similarly
restrictive approaches,5 including members of the European Union.
According to a (leaked) memorandum, the EU is reportedly engaged in
extensive talks with the United States to ‘harmonise’ more stringent checks
on migrants, although the EU alleges that some proposed measures could
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contravene data protection laws.6 The treatment of refugees as potential
security risks is of particular concern to the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has urged States ‘to
strike a careful balance between additional security needs and existing
international refugee protection principles’.7 Human rights advocates and
academics have also raised concerns that the enthusiastic participation of
governments in the ‘war against terrorism’ has increased the threat of
violation of the non-refoulement principle,8 which is an irrevocable principle
considered to be part of international customary law.9
Such events make it all the more important for States and other role-
players to be reminded of their international obligations towards refugees
and international justice, and to remain reflective in their approaches to
difficult questions surrounding both issues. In order to ensure that protection
exists for those who may need it, and that justice is pursued against those who
may deserve it, it is prudent to step back and examine the emerging tensions
between these two important objectives, while at the same time considering
what scope there might be to resolve them.
In my arguments in this article, I do not deny the need to bring human
rights violators to justice, indeed quite the contrary. However, I will seek to
question at what cost this is currently being undertaken in the Netherlands.
In my view, fundamental principles underlying refugee protection and
human rights are being eroded in a hasty and ill-unconsidered manner by
the apparent, though ineffective, pursuit of ‘justice’ in the Netherlands (and
indeed elsewhere in the world), without due regard to the far-reaching
consequences of such hasty actions.
2. PUTTING THE ISSUE IN CONTEXT
Refugee law and international criminal law (including the principle of
universal jurisdiction) operate with sometimes overlapping functions that
ought to be complementary, but which have existed in an uneasy
relationship in practice. This has much to do with the fact that exclusion
applies to a much broader category of offences, and requires a lower
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evidentiary threshold,10 than provided for in international criminal law and
in terms of the universal jurisdiction principle.
2.1. Refugee Law Aims Primarily to Protect Victims
The notion of ‘refugeehood’ and the granting of political asylum are long-
standing legal principles. Throughout juridical history, these concepts have
been enshrined here and there in various documents, but they only really
rose to prominence in the last half-century. In particular, the horrors of the
Second World War, and particularly the Holocaust, which were accompa-
nied by massive displacement of people, created an urgent impetus to
extend the reach of humanitarian law (protecting combatants and,
especially, civilians during times of war) and to establish specific legal rules
to protect those forcibly displaced.
Beyond humanitarian law, refugee law is also firmly based on human rights
principles. Following in the footsteps of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights11 and the creation of the United Nations itself in 1945, the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,12
accompanied by the 1950 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees,13 was one of the first major projects of the UN.
However, the UNHCR agency originally possessed only a limited mandate,
and was created in response to European concerns to ensure the protection
of Europeans. It was in fact only intended to be a temporary agency.
With the expansion of the notion of human rights (and the continuing
violation of these rights), the liberation of formerly colonised States and an
increasingly globalised responsibility to respond to unsettling events in all
parts of the world, the concept of refugeehood gradually developed and was
extended. Following a Protocol to the 1951 Convention,14 the development
of international human rights law and various regional refugee instru-
ments,15 refugee law now (in theory) extends protection to broad categories
of persons who suffer persecution.
Refugee law, through the 1951 Refugee Convention, includes two inter-
related functions, namely a protection function (Article 1A) and an
exclusion function (Article 1F). In the context of this essay, we can see
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11 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) of 10 December 1948.
12 Entry into force: 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 150.
13 UN General Assembly Resolution 428(V) of 14 December 1950. The Statute of the UNHCR’s
immediate predecessor was the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,
entered into force on 20 August 1948, 18 UNTS 3.
14 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, entry into force: 4 October 1967, 606 UNTS 267.
15 These include the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, entry into force: 3 September 1953, ETS, No. 5; and the 1969 Convention on
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Organization of African Unity, entry into
force: 20 June 1974, 1000 UNTS 46.
these as protecting the ‘deserving refugee’ and ensuring ‘that serious
international criminals do not escape punishment’.16 This said, there is no
requirement in refugee law to ensure that excluded persons are prosecuted
or even ‘rendered’ to the authorities.17
The legal standard of proof for invoking Article 1F of the 1951
Convention is ‘serious reasons’, a notoriously vague legal concept that has
been the subject of considerable debate18 (and about which more will be
said later). The scope of exclusion covers three categories of offences:
international crimes19 – Article 1F(a); serious non-political crimes –
Article1F(b); and acts contrary to the principles of the United Nations –
Article 1F(c).20 In most cases, it is only the first category of exclusion –
Article 1F(a) – that is likely to overlap with international criminal law and
the universal jurisdiction principle, although some have controversially (and
in the author’s view mistakenly) argued that category 1F(b) of exclusion
applies to other offences as well, such as terrorism and hijacking.21
2.2. Criminal Law / Universal Jurisdiction Both Aim Primarily to Seek
Justice
International criminal law as a unique juridical concept also emerged
roughly during the last half-century, through the development of
humanitarian law and human rights principles that aimed to challenge
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in International Refugee Law and their Relationship with Universal Jurisdiction’, AFLA
Quarterly, July – September 2001, Africa Legal Aid, Maastricht.
19 Includes ‘crimes against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the
international instruments (...) in respect of such crimes’ – Art. 1F(a), 1951 UN Convention,
supra note 14.
20 For more on this, see Edward Kwakwa, ‘Article 1F(c): Acts Contrary to the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 12, Special
Supplementary Issue, 2000, p. 79.
21 Peter van Krieken, in: Krieken, P.J. van, (ed.), Refugee Law in Context: The Exclusion Clause,
T.M.C. Asser, The Hague, 1999, at pp. 5-6. However, commentators such as Verdirame, loc.cit.
(note 18) and Bruin and Wouter, loc.cit. (note 9), resist this expansionist tendency. Verdirame
argues that as ‘there is still no satisfactory international legal definition of terrorism, the
inclusion or exclusion of members of liberation and resistance movements could become a
function of the relationships of friendliness or enmity that might exist between the host state
and various political movements’. Ibidem, at p. 34.
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impunity by prosecuting those responsible for perpetrating human rights
violations.
The relative success of various ad hoc tribunals set up in response to
massive human rights violations that took place in the former Yugoslavia,
Republic of Rwanda and (recently) Sierra Leone, have accelerated the
development of a Statute to create an International Criminal Court (ICC).
Further, the success of these tribunals has also stimulated an increasing
willingness on the part of States to prosecute human rights violators in their
own countries’ courts using the concept of universal jurisdiction, essentially
an instrument of international criminal law that allows States to exercise
national jurisdiction over individuals in respect of certain international
crimes that are deemed to be of concern to all humanity, without regard to
the nationality of the accused, the victim, or the location where the alleged
crime took place.
Universal jurisdiction draws essentially from two sources: international
humanitarian law and more recent development in international human
rights law and case law jurisprudence. The primary function of international
humanitarian law is to limit levels of violence in armed conflicts by
regulating the methods and means of conducting war, violations of which
are commonly referred to as ‘war crimes’, and are further defined in the
1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocols.22 Its secondary function is to
regulate the treatment of combatants and non-combatants – by extension,
this protection function also operates as a tool to protect those forcibly
displaced.
The universal jurisdiction principle also draws a range of other
International Conventions, including the Convention Against Torture23
and jurisprudence arising out of the various ad hoc tribunals created in the
last century.24
As commentators such as Kamminga have observed,25 while universal
jurisdiction draws from a range of juridical sources, it is important to stress
that it is essentially a concept that refers to the jurisdiction of national courts,
and should be distinguished from the express jurisdiction exercised by
supra-national authorities in terms of binding treaties, such as the ad hoc
tribunals or the ICC.
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23 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, UNGA Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984 (entry into force June 1987).
24 These include the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, established in the aftermath
of the Second World War, the Rwanda Tribunal established in Arusha, Tanzania to adjudicate
crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the International Criminal
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Sierra Leone Tribunal.
25 See Kamminga, M., ‘Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for
International Crimes’, African Legal Aid Quarterly, Africa Legal Aid, Maastricht, July –
September 2001.
The ability to seek justice, whether in a national jurisdiction or
international tribunal, is bound to remain true to the foundation (and
established principles) of human rights, upon which criminal law is based.
2.3. Interfacing of International Criminal Law and Exclusion
Given their overlapping histories, it is no surprise that in recent years,
developments in both refugee law and international criminal law have led to
the interfacing of these two legal regimes; nevertheless, how this should
operate has not always been carefully thought through.
As mentioned earlier, one of the main causes of concern is that the
standards for establishing whether one is excluded or criminally liable are
very different. On the other hand, there is clearly some commonality in the
range of offences that can invoke the exercise of both exclusion and
universal jurisdiction (often concurrently): crimes against humanity; war
crimes; crimes against peace and possibly other serious crimes.
3. WHERE DO THESE TENSIONS ARISE? THE OPERATION OF
EXCLUSION AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN THE
NETHERLANDS26
As a consequence, tensions between the exercise of exclusion and universal
jurisdiction have emerged. These tensions take a variety of forms: for
example, exclusion cannot be reserved for the most serious war criminals,27
nor is it practicable for criminal justice systems to exercise the universal
jurisdiction principle in respect of everyone found to be excluded. Elements
of these tensions can be seen in the operation of exclusion and universal
jurisdiction in the Netherlands.
The Netherlands is a useful example in that it still is considered to have a
relatively liberal refugee status determination system, which processes one
of the largest annual asylum caseloads in Europe.28 It is also one of the few
countries to have tested the principle of universal jurisdiction in the case of
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28 However, see ‘Fleeting refuge: The triumph of efficiency over protection in Dutch asylum
policy’, Human Rights Watch, April 2003, New York.
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Bouterse29 although no prosecution subsequently took place. Furthermore,
the Netherlands is host to the ICC, and Dutch Parliament has passed
legislation to bring its law into conformity with the Court’s Statute.30
While the proportion of excluded asylum cases has traditionally been
quite small in the Netherlands, in recent years the numbers have increased
dramatically,31 through an increasing willingness to invoke the so-called
‘exclusion clause’ under Article 1F of the UN Refugee Convention. In a
letter dated 28 November 1997 addressed to the second chamber of the
Dutch Parliament,32 the State Secretary of the Ministry of Justice responsible
for Immigration comprehensively explained the Dutch Government’s policy
on Article 1F, which, as illustrated below, represented a dramatic break from
previous practice.
A report by the author and two practising lawyers in the Netherlands33
that examined this policy and its implementation three and a half years later
concluded that the process of asylum (and exclusion) determination
contained inadequate safeguards to protect the legitimate rights of asylum
applicants. In short, the procedure in the Netherlands for deciding whether
an applicant ought to be excluded from refugee protection falls far short of
basic principles of due process and natural justice, both in the policy itself
and in its implementation.
Consequently, in the context of Article 1F’s inter-relationship with
international criminal law, major concerns arise, since the implications of
certain exclusion determinations mean that rejected asylum applicants
either become subject to deportation to their country of origin or another
jurisdiction, or, in appropriate cases, arrest, indictment and prosecution
under the universal jurisdiction principle. This follows from the principle of
aut dedere aut judicare, which provides that one who is suspected of having
committed international crimes ought either to be tried in the jurisdiction
in which he or she is found, or deported to another jurisdiction willing to try
the suspect.
3.1. Interview or Interrogation?
During the initial stage of the asylum procedure in the Netherlands, two
interviews take place. The first hearing, according to the department’s own
rules, is intended only to determine nationality, confirm identity and
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29 The Netherlands vs Bouterse, decided in the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 20 November 2000.
30 The Dutch Parliament passed the ICC Implementation Act on 20 June 2002.
31 The Dutch Government began keeping records of exclusion cases in 1989. In August 2000,
the total number reached 109. Six months later, at the end of January 2001, the number had
reached 170. This is according to Weteringkade Advocaten. No official figures could be
obtained from the Dutch Government to confirm this.
32 Tweede Kamer (Dutch Parliament), Vergaderjaar 1997-1998, 19 637, No. 295.
33 Loc.cit. (note 26).
establish travel route (although lawyers have noted that other questions are
also asked). This is followed by a more detailed second interview.34
Depending on an Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) official’s
interpretation of the results of the first interview and IND policy papers
referring to certain countries and groups,35 this interview will take one of
two courses:
1) a ‘normal’ Article 1A inclusion enquiry to determine the applicant’s
motivations in applying for asylum, conducted by an ordinary
immigration officer; or
2) a ‘special’ Article 1F exclusion enquiry, conducted by an official
specially trained in exclusion issues.
Clearly, questions asked at the first interview can have potentially serious
consequences for applicants if they become subject to a ‘special’ Article 1F
enquiry, as this is heavily biased towards determining whether the subjects
ought to be excluded rather than whether they are in need of protection.
Clients have reported that these Article 1F investigations closely resemble
police interrogations.36
3.2. Abandoning Inclusion Before Exclusion
It is fundamental to the integrity of any national asylum/refugee regime that
access to an asylum procedure is guaranteed. Determining first whether or
not an asylum applicant deserves international protection, before conside-
ring whether such a person might be excluded from this protection is, in this
context, inextricably linked to the fundamental principle of presumption of
innocence.37
The Dutch Government’s earlier position on this matter was that a ‘two-
part investigation’ be carried out involving both Article 1A and 1F
determinations:
(1) under Section 1A: an investigation into whether the person
concerned was prevented from calling upon the authorities of his own
Seeking Justice, Guaranteeing Protection and Ensuring Due Process
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 21/4 (2003) 685
34 This is the so-called ‘nader gehoor’, which is the most important basis upon which a
determination to grant status and/or to exclude is made.
35 This is evidenced by various answers to questions put to the Minister of Justice and/or the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Dutch Parliament (Tweede Kamer) concerning, for
example, extremists (Nr. 1718, Vergaderjaar 1997-1998, Aanhangsel 3531) and communists from
Afghanistan (Nr. 534, Vergaderjaar 1994-1995, Aanhangsel 1089), as well as policy papers put
forward to Parliament by the Minister of Justice, for example, concerning Turkish and
Kurdish asylum seekers (Vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 19 637, nr. 494).
36 Report, loc.cit. (note 26), p. 4.
37 Striving for administrative efficiency should not unacceptably compromise the rights of
asylum applicants. See Gilbert, loc.cit. (note 16).
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country to protect him from certain risk of persecution on account of to
[sic] race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political
conviction and (2) under Section 1F: an investigation into whether there
were serious reasons for considering that the person concerned could be
denied refugee status on the grounds of this section.38
However, in the 28 November 1997 letter to parliament referred to above,
the State Secretary made reference to Article 14(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Travaux Pre´paratoires to the 1951
Geneva Convention, arguing that the government’s policy was consistent
with the country’s treaty obligations, yet taking the position that neither the
Convention nor the Dutch Immigration Act applied in circumstances where
an asylum seeker (applicant) might be excluded under section 1F.
This new stance confirmed the position reflected in an earlier statement
addressed to the Speaker of the Dutch Parliament on 19 November 1997,
which held that in considering 1F, ‘there is nothing in the text of the
Convention to indicate that Article 1A must be applied first’. This
represented a major reversal in policy, apparently on the grounds of ‘highly
laborious enquiries’.39
Insistence that an Article 1A enquiry need not be conducted prior to an
Article 1F enquiry has been a position firmly maintained by the government,
in spite of at least two appeals by the UNHCR to the Dutch Secretary of State
for Immigration on the grounds that such a position was not justifiable.40 A
Dutch court in Haarlem regretfully decided to support the government’s
position in a decision dated 27 April 1999.41
Such a position is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the 1951 Geneva
Convention.42 As Gilbert has stated, exclusionary factors in any case tend to
come to light during the course of the determination process in terms of
Article 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention.43 It is therefore difficult to
understand why Article 1A and Article 1F enquiries cannot be incorporated
into a single procedure.
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38 Policy Memo (English translation) by the State Secretary for Justice (Immigration), addressed
to the Speaker of the Lower House, Re: Article 1F of the 1951 Geneva Convention,
19 November 1997.
39 Policy Memo, loc.cit. (note 38).
40 Cited in a case before the Dutch court in Haarlem, upheld by the Rechtbank Den Haag,
Haarlem, 27 April 1999, AWB 98/3609.
41 Haarlem court case, idem.
42 Note the comment by Gilbert that the ‘increased interest in exclusion is part of a wider policy
to limit refugee status in general’, loc.cit. (note 16), p. 5.
43 Ibidem, p. 29, referring to the UNHCR Handbook on Asylum Determination.
3.3. Wrongfully Shifting the Burden of Proof
According to the Dutch Government’s policy, an applicant must have had
‘personal and knowing’ involvement in offences contemplated by Article 1F,
consistent with the so-called ‘Canadian Standard’, where there is an
‘indication’ that the applicant’s story contains the following elements:
1) Whether the applicant participated in (or provided services to) an
organisation that allegedly committed crimes contemplated in Article
1F;
2) Whether the applicant was an active and conscious member, or
working for the organisation (and, if so, in what capacity); and
3) Whether it was possible that after discovering that the organisation
was involved in such crimes, the applicant distanced him/herself from
the organisation.
According to Article 1F, the burden of proving involvement in such offences
ought to lie with the government.44 However, in practice, with some
applicants, the IND effectively makes a pre-determination of whether an
organisation (and by association the applicant) has a ‘cruel purpose’,
without publishing information disclosing the basis for making these
determinations.45 This has the negative effect of shifting the burden of
establishing non-involvement in offences contemplated by Article 1F to the
applicant.
3.4. Lack of Access to Competent Legal Advice
Access to competent legal advice at the early stages of the procedure is
virtually non-existent for most applicants. This is crucial for applicants
subject to Article 1F enquiries on the basis of information gathered in the
first interview, as the conflicting goals of identifying potential violators of
international crimes and protecting persons from persecution under
refugee law make such enquiries complicated and potentially incriminating.
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44 Some, including a senior policy advisor to the State Secretary for Immigration in the
Netherlands, erroneously question this. Special Advisor on International Affairs of the Dutch
Ministry of Justice, Peter van Krieken, wrote that ‘the burden of proof is obvious: the
executive needs to indicate that it has serious reasons for exclusion’ (‘Germany and Article
1F: the urgent need to implement a basic principle’, AWR Bulletin, Vol. 38, No. 3-4, 2000,
pp. 188-196, at p. 193). He goes on to claim that ‘the applicant has to prove his case (that he/
she does not fit the description) with due reference to the benefit-of-the-doubt principle’.
45 See, for example, a decision in the Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage, 9 November 1999, AWB 99/671
VRWET. Thus, it seems that the Canadian test is not being applied generally, but only in
circumstances where an applicant is not believed to be a member of an organisation with a
‘cruel purpose’.
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3.5. Illusion of Confidentiality
Before the detailed interview takes place (whether this is the ‘normal’
Article 1A or ‘special’ Article 1F interview), applicants are told by IND
officials that they must not hold back any relevant information, and that this
information will be treated in confidence. They are not informed of the
consequences of a possible Article1F determination.46
However, the promise of confidentiality is an illusion, as all information
collected during the interview process is handed over to the public
prosecutor in the event that an applicant is, in fact, found to be excluded
in terms of Article 1F.
3.6. Inappropriate Reliance on Country Reports
Information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the form of
country reports (ambtsbericht) results in applicants from certain countries
being more likely to be subject to an Article1F investigation than others.
Reliance on these country reports thus plays a significant role in pre-
determining whether applicants ought to be subject to the exclusion process.
As explained in the original report,47 these country reports are often
unreliable and difficult to challenge, as the sources of information are often
missing; yet, in spite of this, the IND regards the information they provide
about groups or people as conclusive.
3.7. Inability to Prosecute
Finally, the Dutch Government has clearly indicated its commitment to
ensure that alleged perpetrators of human rights violations do not escape
with impunity.48 But while the Government has shown itself to be
enthusiastic in invoking the Article 1F exclusion clause, it has not delivered
on its commitment to bring accused persons to justice.49
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46 It is widely observed by practitioners and refugee advocates that asylum applicants often make
their case worse by trying to say what they imagine the interviewer is expecting to hear.
47 Report, loc.cit. (note 26), p. 4.
48 Policy Memo, loc.cit. (note 38): ‘The Netherlands is obliged by these Conventions to see to the
punishment or extradition of any persons accused of such offences on an aut dedere aut
judicare basis’.
49 Among a number of wide-ranging observations, the extensive evaluation of the ‘National
Investigations Team for War Criminals’ by Beijer, Klip, Oomen and Van der Spek found that
‘within the period under evaluation, not one writ of summons was issued’, Samenvatting
evaluatie NOVO (EWB-rapport) on the website of www.ministerievanjustitie.nl, p. 1. Full
reference to the report is Beijer, A., Klip, A.H., Oomen, M.A., Van der Spek, A.M.J., Evaluatie
van het Nationaal Opsporingsteam voor Oorlogsmisdrijven, Willem Pompe Instituut voor
Strafrechtswetenschappen, Universiteit Utrecht, Utrecht, 2002.
The current practice in the Netherlands is that decisions in terms of
Article 1F are handed over to the office of the public prosecutor in Arnhem,
which is responsible for the prosecution of persons suspected of having
committed war crimes. A special ‘Novo Team’ of 15 persons50 was
established and tasked with tracing and prosecuting persons suspected of
committing war crimes, particularly those from Afghanistan and the former
Yugoslavia. In the period January 1998 – January 2001, 170 cases were sent
on to the public prosecutor, 127 of which were investigated by the ‘Novo
Team’. Of these, 96 cases involved the investigation of Afghans, of which it
seems that only a few revealed sufficient evidence of personal involvement in
international crimes to establish a prosecution.51
Limitations in exercising universal jurisdiction in the Netherlands were
further confirmed on 20 November 2000, when the Court of Amsterdam
took a decision in Bouterse, a case that considered the legal grounds for
liability and prosecution in the Netherlands of crimes against humanity and
violations of the Convention Against Torture.52
In light of these factors, unless substantial and deliberate steps are taken
by the government to form a coherent policy, it is doubtful that prosecution
for international crimes can be established in Dutch law.
4. ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THE TENSIONS
Having considered the tensions that arise in the exercise of these two
principles of exclusion and universal jurisdiction, it is worth considering
how they might be resolved. It is proposed that this involve essentially three
areas: better co-ordination between the relevant government departments
responsible for exercising asylum determination and exercising prosecu-
tions; a firm guarantee of due process in the exercising of exclusion
determinations; and finally, a principled, rights-regarding commitment to
carry through with the principle of aut dedere aut judicare.
4.1. Recognising the Interface
As a starting point, it is important to be deliberate and pragmatic in
pursuing these principles, recognising that there is an interface in the
invocation of exclusion and the exercise of universal jurisdiction, each
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50 It is understood by the author that at the time of writing, the staff of this unit has increased.
51 Question in Parliament about the NOVO team, 8 February 2001, to the Minister of Justice
and confirmed by Beijer, Klip, Oomen and Van der Spek, op.cit. (note 49).
52 The case was in respect of the so-called ‘December Murders’, which took place in 1982 in
Surinam. Prof. Mr G.A.M. Strijards, commenting on the case in ‘Nederlands Dualisme en zijn
strafmacht’, Nederlands Juristenblad 2000/44, noted that lack of a basis for jurisdiction
preventing prosecution arose as the Convention Against Torture only came into force in
1989, seven years after the crimes took place.
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having their separate yet complementary functions. By extension, there is a
need for greater co-ordination between the departmental authority
responsible for asylum determination (and invoking the exclusion clause)
and the authority responsible for pursuing prosecutions in application of
the universal jurisdiction principle.53 Both must be clear about the
implications of an exclusion determination, and these implications must
be clearly communicated to the applicant concerned.
4.2. Importance of Due Process Standards
This analysis clearly shows that the central tension that arises between these
two principles concerns the need to exercise an adequate standard of due
process in making an exclusion determination. The legitimacy of a country’s
asylum determination regime is at grave risk when the pressure to prosecute
outweighs fundamental human rights standards in determining whether or
not an applicant ought to be subject to an exclusion determination in the
first place. Furthermore, a universal jurisdiction claim exercised under such
circumstances might have little chance of ending in a successful prosecu-
tion. Therefore, resolving the ‘central tension’ between these two principles
must necessarily involve enhancing due process in the exercise of an
exclusion determination.54 More specifically, the standards for guaran-
teeing due process in exclusion cases demand that such determinations be
free of bias, that due consideration be given to the ‘serious reasons’
standard, that in appropriate cases proportionality be properly and
consistently measured (weighing the crime committed against its political
objective), and that the decision be based on a properly conducted
interview.
4.2.1. Avoiding ‘Blind Blanket’ Exclusions
‘Blind blanket’ exclusions on the basis of pre-determined information (i.e.,
profiling of suspects, without adequate opportunity for individual hearings
on an asylum claim) clearly reveals bias on the part of the authorities and
should be avoided.55 Such an approach is not only in serious danger of
compromising fundamental principles of refugee protection, but as
illustrated above, is quite unlikely to stand up to court challenge. In any
event, it presents a hasty, unconsidered response to pursuing justice against
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53 Fitzpatrick, loc.cit. (note 17), p. 282.
54 See Gilbert, loc.cit. (note 16), as well as a comprehensive report produced by the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, published in a Special Supplementary Issue of the International
Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 12, 2000.
55 Verdirame, loc.cit. (note 18), and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 56, at
p. 338, both stress the need for an ‘individualised procedure’ for determining exclusion.
alleged violators of international crimes, one likely to create a backlog of
potential indictments that will prove virtually impossible to prosecute.
4.2.2. Protecting the ‘Serious Reasons’ Standard
There should be clear, enforceable guidelines on achieving the serious
reasons standard required in international law and often reflected in
legislation.56 A person must be judged on his or her personal involvement in
alleged excludable offences. Such guidelines would need to include a
credible admission from the applicant and more than mere membership of
an organisation, in cases where there is considerable evidence that the
organisation has committed excludable offences. Finally, as an additional
measure for reaching the ‘serious reasons’ standard, it has been
recommended by a legal advisory group commissioned by the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights that an equivalent of the evidentiary standard
for issuing an indictment from the ICC would constitute ‘clear and
convincing reasons’ for invoking exclusion.57
4.2.3. Considering Proportionality
Secondly, the ‘proportionality’ regarding the political aspect of the
accused’s alleged offences ought to be duly balanced against a range of
mitigating factors. The most obvious factor, in the case of the more common
Article 1F(b) exclusion determinations58 (most of which would probably not
stand up to prosecution under the universal jurisdiction principle) is the
political nature of the offence committed. Some suggest that Article 1F(b)
should not be imposed ‘where the severity of persecutory punishment would
outweigh the criminal character of the offender’.59 However, in the case of
any exclusion determination, all relevant mitigating factors must be taken
into account, particularly in the case of applicants who may have been child
soldiers. Such cases should receive special consideration.60
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56 These recommendations partly draw upon a comprehensive report by the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights on the subject, loc.cit. (note 54).
57 ‘Safeguarding the Rights of Refugees under the Exclusion Clauses: Summary finding from
the project and a Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Perspective’, Vol. 12, Special
Supplementary Issue, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2000, at p. 329.
58 Article 1F(b) of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, provides that an applicant may be
excluded if ‘he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior
to his admission to that country as a refugee’ (emphasis added).
59 Fitzpatrick, loc.cit. (note 17), at p. 277.
60 See the ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the expert of the Secretary-
General, Grac¸a Machel’, submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/157; The
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
20 november 1989, UNGA Resolution 44/25; and Refugee Children: Guidelines on Protection and
Care, UNHCR, Geneva, 1994.
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4.2.4. Properly Conducted Interview
There must also be a properly conducted interview, as opposed to an
interrogation, which often occurs in the pursuit of Article 1F exclusion
enquiries. Such an interview ought to be orientated towards establishing the
facts of a particular applicant’s circumstances; namely, what they might have
done that could qualify or exclude them from being recognised as a refugee.
Conducting such an interview is by no means an easy task, requiring high-
level communication skills.61 It is only after such fact-finding has been
undertaken that a departmental authority will be in any position to make a
sound judgement on an applicant’s claim.
Following such a fact-finding interview, if the determination official
intends to invoke the exclusion clause, the applicant ought to be informed
that exclusion is being considered, and the consequences should be
explained to him or her. Such a determination ought to be reached only
after an oral hearing (allowing the applicant to present his/her side of the
story), which incorporates appropriate procedural safeguards, provides an
opportunity for independent review and, most crucially, permits access to
competent legal assistance.
It is only if these criteria have been met that an accused ought to be
extradited to the jurisdiction of an international court or tried for an
international crime under the universal jurisdiction principle.
4.3. Consequences of Exclusion: Aut dedere aut judicare
If properly implemented rights-regarding exclusion procedures are follo-
wed, the aut dedere aut judicare principle can be a potentially important tool
for ensuring compliance with international human rights standards and
curtailing the impunity of human rights violators.62
Aut dedere aut judicare entails an obligation to ensure a prosecution
against someone who has committed serious human rights crimes. In
practical terms, this means one of three things: deportation to one’s country
of origin to face prosecution; extradition to another jurisdiction (whether
this be another national jurisdiction, an ad hoc tribunal or the soon-to-be-
established international criminal court);63 or prosecution within the host
State in terms of the universal jurisdiction principle.
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61 For a useful survey of some of the ‘bottlenecks’ encountered in communicating with groups
from markedly different cultural backgrounds (in this case the Somali community in the
Netherlands), see Nieuwhof, A. and Mohamoud, A., ‘Communicatie, sleutel tot participatie’
[Communication, the key to participation], Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken [Internal
Affairs], The Hague, March 2000.
62 Although, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to attach any obligation to it, particularly by
protection agencies such as the UNHCR. Fitzpatrick, loc.cit. (note 17), at p. 279, states very
clearly that ‘the UNHCR has no aut dedere aut judicare obligation under international law’.
63 States should also develop clear structures for rendering suspects to the ad hoc tribunals and
the International Criminal Court. Some have already done so.
In all cases of exclusion, extradition and deportation must be carried out
in accordance with two main safeguards. Firstly, due consideration must be
given to human rights protections provided for in certain universally
binding international human rights instruments;64 the likelihood (or lack
thereof) of a fair trial in the receiving country, for example, would be one
such area of concern.65 Secondly, States party to the Convention Against
Torture are prohibited from deporting a person to a country where they
would face a substantial risk of torture.
The third option, prosecution in the host country in terms of the
universal jurisdiction principle, can be a highly desirable outcome in the
pursuance of international justice and contribute to the ending of impunity,
again provided there is no danger of refoulement and that appropriate
safeguards for a fair trial are in place.66 Prosecution of these offences should
be prompt, avoiding a situation where accused persons languish in prison
for years. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, it must be clearly understood
that not all excludable offences will be prosecutable in terms of
international criminal law; indeed, few of them will.
Under current circumstances, it is highly doubtful whether the objective
of Article 1F(a) – concerning international crimes – can be satisfactorily
fulfilled if no international or national (universal) jurisdiction can be
established to pursue a prosecution. Furthermore, it remains unclear
whether aut dedere aut judicare applies as a matter of obligation following an
exclusion determination; even recognising the existence of universal jurisdic-
tion as a juridical concept is not without its complications.67
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64 Notably the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Resolution 217 A(III) and
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Resolution 2200
A(XXI), both of which are widely regarded as part of international customary law and thus
universally binding.
65 Bruin and Wouter, loc.cit. (note 9), would no doubt agree, having considered the implications
of deportation following an Article 1F determination with extensive reference to the
approach adopted by the Canadian High Court.
66 The military commissions proposed in the United States, by contrast, should be resisted. See
Fitzpatrick, J., ‘The Constitutional and International Invalidity of Military Commissions under
the November 13, 2001 ‘‘Military Order’’ ’ (unpublished paper), posted on the IMMPROF
list-server on 28 November 2001 and a range of views by NGOs such as Amnesty International
(www.amnesty.org), the American Bar Association (www.abanet.org/media/jan02/terro-
rism_milcomm.html), Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) and International Commission
of Jurists (www.icj.org), to name but a few.
67 There are some who endorse principles of international criminal law as being part of
international customary law. Gilbert, loc.cit. (note 16), at p. 12, quotes Cassese: ‘customary
international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common Article 3
(relating to the Geneva Conventions referring to various international crimes), as
supplemented by other general principles and rules on the protection of victims of internal
armed conflict, and for breaching certain fundamental principles and rules regarding means
and methods of combat in civil strife’. Others resist the use of international customary law to
‘fill up any jurisdictional gaps’ in establishing a universal jurisdiction claim; see Wilt, H. van
der, in: AFLA Quarterly, ibidem, at p. 22.
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Dealing with excluded applicants thus creates a difficult conundrum. On
the one hand, there is the principle that such persons are entitled to a fair
trial, which may prevent deportation or extradition to a country where the
crimes were allegedly committed.68 On the other hand, failure of
governments to establish jurisdiction, let alone build a sufficient case,
prevents a ‘local’ prosecution from taking place.
Coupled with the lack of a mechanism for ensuring rights-regarding
asylum determinations, and in cases where some governments (such as the
Netherlands) are willing to exercise a broad standard in invoking Article 1F
against asylum applicants, both the non-refoulement principle and the aut
dedere aut judicare principle are simultaneously in danger of being
compromised.
5. CONCLUSION
As this article has attempted to illustrate, tensions between the principle of
exclusion and the principle of universal jurisdiction (indeed, establishing
jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes generally) result from the
different objectives of international humanitarian law and human rights law.
This has two main consequences: the first is an added tendency towards
restrictive policies in asylum determination; the second poses a tricky
paradox, as described above, when it comes to dealing with applicants after
they have been excluded. Both require a major rethinking of the operation
of Article 1F as a sine qua non for ensuring rights-regarding determination
procedures, and an effective exercise of jurisdiction over international
crimes.
Resolving these tensions requires firstly ensuring better communication
between the relevant authorities responsible for exercising exclusion and
exercising prosecutions under the universal jurisdiction principle, with both
authorities recognising from the outset, and communicating to the
applicants concerned, that the outcomes of exclusion may in some cases
lead to a criminal prosecution. Secondly, resolving these tensions requires
that there be acceptable standards in asylum determination systems
responsible for exercising exclusion and a firm commitment to carry out
the explicit intentions of aut dedere aut judicare.
The operation of exclusion in the Netherlands is a good example of why
some believe that a ‘crisis’ exists in the international asylum regime.
However, rather than simply adapting the system to meet the political
interests of governments keen to limit the number of asylum claims while
also pursuing an increasingly aggressive strategy towards those accused of
committing international crimes, it is suggested that the answer lies
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68 Gilbert, loc.cit. (note 16), who recognises the principles of non-refoulement and freedom from
torture as peremptory norms, at pp. 8, 24, 30 and 43, is unequivocal: ‘The fear of persecution
should prevent refoulement no matter what the crime – a very serious crime should be
prosecuted in the state where the applicant seeks refugee status’ (ibidem, p. 19).
primarily in a principled commitment to human rights. Ensuring that due
process guarantees are respected in exercising asylum status determination,
coupled with a firm commitment to consider exercising criminal jurisdic-
tion over those who it is determined are appropriately to be excluded from
refugee protection, will both enhance the credibility of asylum regimes and
result in more successful prosecutions.
Rather than operating against each other, the two principles of non-
refoulement and aut dedere aut judicare should be seen, and implemented, as
complementary instruments, both to protect the victims of human rights
violations and ensure that the impunity of the perpetrators of such
violations is ended.
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